















  The actual distribution of world income across countries is extremely unequal, much 
higher than the within country inequality faced by most countries.  The question 
studied in this paper is: how do international policies on aid, trade and factor 
movements affect the international distribution of income? 
 
To begin to answer this question, we calculate the impact by decile of the actual level 
of aid flows and the effect on potential income of merchandise trade restrictions by 
high-income countries.  We find that aid’s distributional impact is equality enhancing; 
while it is extremely small in terms of changes in standard inequality measures, it is of 
some importance for the lowest decile of the world’s income distribution.  We also 
find that some of this impact is counteracted by lost potential income in the lower 
deciles from merchandise trade barriers imposed by high-income countries.  In brief, 
there is a contradiction in international policies where aid’s equality-enhancing effect 
is somewhat offset by protectionism.  We also discuss some of the analytical 
difficulties with extending this analysis of redistribution to other forms of international 
factor flows—more specifically, migrant worker and profit remittances. 
 
The analysis presented here is partial and static and ignores within country 
distribution. As such, we suggest that future research should explore the distributional 
consequences of the broader general equilibrium effects, dynamic effects, and 
externalities associated with aid, trade, and factor flows.  Future research should also 
analyze the within country distributional impacts of international policies. 
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  There has been an active literature in recent years on the world distribution of income.  
Some discussions focus on the “inter-country” distribution of income; that is, a distribution 
where countries are weighted equally, with China having the same weight as Barbados (for 
example, see Jones 1997).  Other studies, like Theil and Seale (1994), still treat countries as 
the unit of analysis, but weigh their influence on world income distribution by population 
size.  In what follows, this method is said to refer to the “international” distribution of income.  
Still other papers, such as the latest World Development Report of the World Bank (World 
Bank 2005b), combine estimates of within country inequality with those of international 
inequality to arrive at a more complete picture of income distribution, referred to as the 
“global” distribution of income.  
  In this paper
1, we focus on the international distribution of income, abstracting from 
the admittedly critical element of within country inequality, since the purpose of our study 
does not allow us to take satisfactory account of the latter component of global inequality.
 2  
Practical reasons for overlooking within country inequality are twofold.  First, the calculations 
are much simpler.  In particular, we can abstain from the recent debate on whether weighted 
inequality measures should be based on household survey data or national accounts data 
(Sala-i-Martin 2002, Bhalla 2002 vs. Milanovic 2002, Ravallion 2001).  Furthermore, it has 
been shown that international inequality accounted for approximately 60 percent of overall 
inequality across the world’s citizens as recently as 1992 (Bourguignon and Morrison 2002) 
                                                 
1 Some of these results were presented at the World Bank’s Annual Bank Conference on Development 
Economics (ABCDE), Washington D.C., May 3rd, 2004 and at the “ABCDE-Europe”, Brussels, May 10
th 2004. 
2 Elsewhere (Bourguignon et al. 2004) we have shown that a more detailed analysis of individual countries’ 
mobility along the income per capita scale provides an interesting perspective on the two seemingly contrary 
streams of the literature:  the economic divergence literature, and the literature showing that inequality across 
countries has decreased over the recent period.    
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and much more if one focuses on  time changes rather than the absolute value of overall 
global inequality. The second reason to ignore within country inequality is that, in view of 
available data and methods for incidence analysis, there is practically no way to take into 
account the within country distributional impact  of global redistribution mechanisms studied 
in this paper.  
The objective of this paper is to analyze how direct transfers of aid as well as 
international policies that limit trade opportunities and possibly flows of labor and capital 
affect the international distribution of income.  One of the international redistribution 
channels is the allocation of foreign aid by high-income donors to developing country 
recipients.  To the extent that official development assistance (ODA) is in grant form or can 
be made equivalent to pure grants, these transfers can be thought of, in the short run, as pure 
redistribution of global income.   
  Trade is another area of international policy we consider in this paper.  A successful 
implementation of multilateral trade liberalization via the Doha Development Round would 
increase the world’s and many countries’ GDP, with interesting distributional consequences.  
While recognizing that most of the gains from multilateral trade liberalization would arise 
from the lowering of trade barriers between developing countries, we concentrate here on the 
redistribution effects of merchandise trade reform by high-income countries in order to 
compare these effects to those of ODA.  Using World Bank’s computable general equilibrium 
(CGE) Linkage Model (van der Mensbrugghe 2005), we analyze the international 
redistribution of income that would result from fully liberalizing merchandise trade by high-
income countries.    
  3
  Although politicians sometimes conflate the concepts of aid and worker or profit 
remittances, the latter have a much more complicated impact on the welfare of both the 
sending and the host countries, and therefore present a singular problem in our empirical 
analysis of global redistribution.  We discuss the nature of these difficulties while also 
presenting some recent results, which point to the scale of redistribution that occurs through 
these flows. 
  The paper first describes the actual level of international inequality in 2002, which we 
will treat as a baseline in our further analysis.  Then, we provide a brief summary of the 
theoretical literature on the transfer problem, as it relates to redistribution via aid and other 
flows.  Empirical sections that follow discuss the actual impact of aid flows and the potential 
impact of merchandise trade reform in high-income countries.  Finally, there is a discussion of 
the conceptual and empirical difficulties of conducting a similar analysis for both worker and 
profit remittances.  We conclude with a discussion of some tentative policy implications of 
the quantitative results. 
 
II. The international distribution of income 
We used the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI) 2004 for data on 
population and gross national income (GNI) in PPP-adjusted dollars.
3  (See Appendix 3 for 
the list of countries.)   The international distribution of income was obtained by assigning to 
every individual in the world the GNI per capita of the country he/she lives in. Figure 1 
reveals details about the international distribution of income in 2002.  In population-weighted 
terms, the poorest 40 percent of world population received just over 10 percent of world GNI, 
                                                 
3 Drawing on the data used in Bourguignon et al. (2004), we deflated the GNI, PPP series to 1995 prices using 
the implicit United States GDP deflator found in WDI  
  4
while the richest 20 percent commanded more than 60 percent of global national income.  If 
we compare the two extremes, the ratio of the top vintile’s GNI per capita to the bottom 
decile’s GNI per capita is 37 to 1.  The population-weighted Gini coefficient of international 
inequality in 2002 was 53.8, a value that is slightly below inequality in the most inegalitarian 
countries in the world, such as Nicaragua (55.1), Brazil (58.5) (World Bank 2004b)
 or South 
Africa (58) (Hoogeveen and Ozler 2004).
4  It is important to remember that, as described 
above, our measure of international inequality does not take into consideration within country 
inequality; hence, “true” global inequality is much higher than what we have described here.  
Thus, if the world were a single country, it would be one of the most unequal countries in the 
world.  
Figure 1: 2002 International Distribution of GNI per capita (1995 PPP Dollars)  

































Source:  Authors’ estimates based on data from World Bank (2004b).  Country-specific curves are smoothed 
curves based on deciles information.  
As high as international inequality was in 2002, it appeared even greater in the two 
preceding decades, as measured by standard inequality indices.  Bourguignon et al. (2004) 
                                                 
4 Hoogeveen and Ozler (2004) use consumption Gini for South Africa, but presumably, income Gini would be 
even higher.  
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analyze the different conclusions reached by studies of trends in international inequality and 
economic divergence.  If one takes an anonymous view to who is in the various deciles of the 
world distribution and weighs countries by their population size, then the impressive growth 
of populous states like China and India in the last two decades serves as a powerful equalizing 
force for the international distribution of income.  However, if one tracks mobility of 
countries’ citizens through time, the trend is less unambiguous since many countries, mostly 
in Africa, had negative growth rates during that period. This ambiguity is similar to the 
difference observed between international and inter-country inequality. If one weighs 
countries equally, the impact of China’s or India’s growth, which has pulled millions of 
people out of poverty, is reduced to a single observation, and thus inter-country inequality is 
found to be rising not falling.
5  Thus, Bourguignon et al. (2004) conclude that there was no 
Pareto improvement in the international distribution of income in 1980 to 2002, and the 
conclusions about rising or falling international inequality are rooted more in value judgments 
than straight data. 
III. Forms of international redistribution  
  Without a global government, redistribution policies across countries are decided in a 
decentralized manner by national governments, individual citizens and firms.  Redistribution 
of income takes place through a variety of channels, and there are numerous ways to account 
for the impact and the international policies that affect them.  The simplest and most direct 
instrument of international income redistribution is official development assistance (ODA).  
ODA flows are a part of a recipient country’s gross national income, and one can simply 
deduct these flows from actual GNI to determine the static effect of aid as an instrument of 
                                                 
5 For an in-depth discussion of the evolution of inter-country and international inequality see Milanovic (2005)  
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income redistribution; similarly, since donor’s GNI is calculated after ODA disbursements, 
one would simply add the ODA provided by a donor back to the donor’s GNI to obtain the 
counterfactual.  
By treating ODA as simple income transfers, we ignore the effects it may have on 
donor and recipient economies. Even before considering distributional impacts within 
countries or externalities —such as knowledge transfer that occur with aid — these effects 
may be subtle.  There is a substantial theoretical literature on the general equilibrium effects 
of transfer flows between countries, starting with the early papers on German war reparations 
— aid “in reverse,” one might say —focusing  on how changes in the terms-of-trade due to 
the transfer could impact the transfer’s real value.
6 In the related macroeconomic literature, 
the focus has been on real exchange rate appreciation, and the concern that aid may lead to 
“Dutch disease” type effects that inhibit the export and the import-competing sector (Corden 
and Neary 1982).  
Beyond the static general equilibrium effects, a more thorough understanding of aid’s 
effect would include the dynamic impact of aid on relative growth rates of countries.  A 
voluminous empirical literature estimating the impact of aid on growth has developed in 
recent years (for an overview, see Clemens et al. 2004).  The regression results emerging from 
these studies often contradict each other, with no real consensus emerging at the present time; 
this makes it difficult to estimate with any degree of precision the impact of aid on growth of 
developing countries, and through growth, on the international distribution of income.  
                                                 
6 Early formalized contributions include Samuelson (1952, 1954) or (Bhagwati et al. 1983) for more than two 
countries.  More recent models have focused on the small-country setting (Yano and Nugent, 1999).  
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However, we do acknowledge that these dynamic impacts are likely to be significant, and 
perhaps, much larger than the static impacts discussed in this paper.
7 
  In addition to a direct form of redistribution via aid, there are more indirect 
instruments.  The flows of goods and services, capital, labor, and knowledge all have impacts 
on the income of the world’s countries and citizens.  Of course, it is not these flows per se that 
directly contribute to redistributing income internationally since most of them have their 
counterpart.  For instance, the flow of exports from country i to country j cannot be 
considered as an income transfer from j to i since the foregone consumption of j must be taken 
into account — or equivalently the compensating import flows from all countries to j.  
Likewise, private capital flows from country i to country j have a counterpart, which are the 
profits repatriated by or the debt service to country j.  If international markets were working 
fully competitively, these flows would not involve any sacrifice by one country for the benefit 
of another, unlike untied aid.  In effect, the international redistribution behind those flows lies 
in the market imperfections that are under the control of the various nations and prevent more 
or different flows to take place and some countries to obtain all the benefit they could have 
with unrestricted flows of inputs and outputs.  Protection of agricultural markets by rich 
countries, for example, contributes to lowering the international price of agricultural 
commodities, thereby inflicting a penalty on exporters or potential exporters.  This is where 
international redistribution that is somewhat comparable to aid takes place, except unlike in 
the case of aid, it is not a zero-sum game.  Likewise, restrictions on migration by some 
countries prevent flows of labor from taking place, and it is those restrictions that reduce, 
generally asymmetrically, the benefits of international labor flows for sending and host 
                                                 
7 Appendix 1 presents an overview of this literature and a simulation of the dynamic impacts based on the results 
of one of the more prominent papers in the literature.  
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countries.  The challenge then is to estimate the income equivalent of welfare changes due to 
the current asymmetric barriers to the flows of goods, services, and factors, or the welfare 
impact of changing the existing barriers. 
In this paper, we concentrate on the impact of trade liberalization by high-income 
countries on all countries’ national incomes and the resulting effect on the international 
distribution of income.  Removal of trade barriers by a group of countries could raise the 
income of the world as a whole, so trade liberalization clearly is positive-sum game.  
However, there may be winners and losers and, even in case there are only winners, some 
countries may gain more or less than others during the process of liberalization.  Below, for 
simplicity’s sake, we restrict our attention to the static gains from liberalization of trade in 
goods, and we continue to measure the redistributive impact solely through relative GNI per 
capita of countries. 
  Throughout the following sections, we will essentially focus on the static impacts of 
aid and trade liberalization.  It turns out that there are difficult conceptual and empirical issues 
that make even this static impact analysis difficult for the examination of international 
redistribution taking place through national restrictions to migration or capital flows.  Also, 
we recognize that important distributional impacts might be tied to the dynamic impacts of 
these flows.  Many questions, like how capital flows or migration affect potential GDP 
growth, or how aid affects capital accumulation and economic growth, are critical to a more 
complete understanding of global distribution and redistribution but lie outside the scope of 
this paper.
 8  
 
                                                 
8 We recognize that technical knowledge may be one of the most important economic flows affecting the world 
redistribution of income; however, this flow is particularly difficult to model and measure, and as such, it is 
beyond the scope of the exploratory analysis of this paper.  
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IV. International redistribution through aid 
To evaluate the static impact that actual aid flows have on international income 
inequality, we conducted a simple exercise, treating grant aid flows and the grant element of 
concessional loans as direct income transfers from donor countries to developing countries. In 
doing so, we also assumed that all individuals within the country benefit equally from this 
transfer in the same way they were assumed to share equally the GNI.  Since gross national 
income includes aid transfers as an accounting concept, the exercise consisted of subtracting 
out aid flows received by the beneficiary countries and adding the value of those flows back 
to donors’ GNI.  The OECD/DAC database (DAC 2004) allowed us to compile a dataset of 
different types of aid flows by donor-recipient pairs. 
The most straightforward type of aid is bilateral grants, which are given by a donor 
country to a recipient country with no expectations of repayment.
9  To these flows, we added 
the grant-equivalents of concessional lending, received by developing countries from bilateral 
donors.  We calculated the grant-equivalents of bilateral net concessional lending using each 
donor’s average grant element of ODA loans over the 1995-2002 period, based on annual 
grant element data from OECD’s Development Cooperation Reports (OECD 1998-2002).
10   
To take into account bilateral contributions to multilateral agencies as well as 
multilateral agencies’ distribution of aid to developing countries, we used the data from 
                                                 
9  For each of the flows (bilateral grants, bilateral loans, and imputed multilateral contributions), we have 
distributed “unspecified” and “unallocated” aid (listed as a regional aggregate) back to the region’s members, 
using a pro rata calculation based on specified donor-recipient flows. 
10 Some DAC donors (Denmark and Switzerland), which had concessional loans in 2002, did not have the data 
on concessionality of these loans in the Development Cooperation Reports.  For these donors, we used the 
average of DAC donors’ grant element of ODA loans.  Non-DAC bilateral donors (Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Iceland, South Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovak Republic, and Turkey) do not report their loans 
individually, so OECD/DAC cannot calculate the concessionality of these loans.  Since non-DAC bilateral 
donors were only recently emerging-market economies themselves, we assume that their lending is least 
concessional, and we assign a zero grant element to their concessional loans.  We thank Ms. Yasmin Ahmad in 
OECD/DAC who helped us to gather the data on grant elements and explained to us the intricacies behind these 
numbers.  
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OECD/DAC on the imputed multilateral contribution.
11  Since multilateral agencies have a 
wide range of lending concessionality (from IMF’s 25-30% to UN agencies’ 100%) and since 
it would be a very data-intensive exercise to try to obtain grant elements for each of our 
multilateral donors, we performed several sensitivity tests with respect to the grant 
equivalence of the imputed multilateral component of the aid flows, assuming that this grant 
element was, in turn, 50 / 65 / 80 percent.
12  These tests showed that final results were 
marginally sensitive to the share of that grant element.  The total amount of grant-equivalent 
aid in current US$ in 2002 used for the simulation is 53.6 / 56.2 / 58.8 billion, depending on 
the grant element of imputed multilateral contribution.
13 
    
A second measurement issue is the treatment of debt relief in the aid data.  Grants for 
debt relief count for the whole future flow of debt service saved – in 2002, debt relief 
consisting of debt forgiveness grants and rescheduled debt made up almost 10% of total net 
ODA
14; however, in our calculations we are trying to estimate the impact of an annual flow of 
aid.  As a result, we examined data on the annual debt service in 2001-2002 as a fraction of 
the stock of official debt outstanding.  It turns out that this ratio is roughly 4 percent (World 
Bank 2005a).   
                                                 
11 OECD/DAC calculates the imputed multilateral contribution by distributing each DAC donor country’s 
contribution to multilateral agencies to recipient countries, using pro rata calculation of the percentage the 
multilateral agency gives in grants or concessional loans to each particular recipient.  These figures are then 
added across multilateral agencies that receive contributions from this particular DAC donor country to arrive at 
a donor-recipient “imputed multilateral” contribution. 
12 Results of these sensitivity exercises are available from the authors upon request. 
13 To make these data comparable to our base of actual GNI per capita, we deflated these aid volumes to 1995 
dollars, using the same procedure as we had used for deflating GNI in Section II. 
14 As suggested by OECD/DAC, we included (negative) offsetting entries for debt relief in this calculation to 
avoid double-counting (DCD/DAC 2002).  
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A third issue concerns aid disbursed as technical cooperation. It usually does not go 
through the recipient country’s budget, and as such does not have a real effect on the 
recipient’s GNI. We have netted it out in two of the scenarios presented below. 
Finally, an important issue that arises in measuring the redistributive effect of aid is 
whether aid flows should be subtracted from countries’ gross national incomes (expressed in 
PPP dollars) in dollar terms or in PPP dollars.  If one converts the aid flows into PPP dollars, 
then the redistribution of aid is no longer zero-sum.
 15  Yet, it is shown in appendix 2 that this 
is a satisfactory way of proceeding if indeed welfare is measured by PPP-corrected GNI. 
General equilibrium effects of aid actually lead to a corrective term but that term is likely to 
be small.   
In summary, there are three measurement issues for which we calculated various 
different scenarios.  The first issue is the grant equivalence of imputed multilateral lending, 
the second issue is the inclusion of debt relief in the aid figures, and the third issue is whether 
technical cooperation should be included or excluded from this analysis. 
To arrive at a range of values for the redistributive impact, we then took as a maximum 
value scenario as follows:  0.8 grant equivalent for concessional lending, aid flows measured 
in PPP dollars relative to PPP-corrected GNI per capita, zero discounting of debt relief so that 
the stock is counted as is reported to OECD, and technical cooperation not netted out.  For a 
minimum distributive impact calculation, we lowered the grant equivalent of lending to 0.5, 
and completely removed both debt relief and technical cooperation from the aid flows.  
Finally, for an intermediate calculation – and our preferred estimate— we used the 0.5 grant 
                                                 
15 To convert aid in dollars to aid in PPP terms, we multiply the former by a ratio of GDP, PPP to GDP in 
dollars, all taken from WDI 2004.  
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equivalent scenario for lending flows, and discounted debt relief by 96 percent (leaving the 
four percent average debt service flow) while still netting out all technical cooperation. 
The table below presents inequality indices with (base case) and without aid flows for 
the year 2002, using the three scenarios described above.  The difference between the 
minimum calculation and the intermediate calculation is so small that we have chosen not to 
include it in the table or figure below.  Figure 2 shows the impact of aid on the mean GNI per 
decile of the international distribution.  
Table 1.  Impact of aid flows, 2002 
 
Case (all income inequality measures 
population -weighted) 
 Atkinson 





Dev e=0.5  e=2  e=5 
Base (after aid) 159  0.5380  0.5305  0.5316  0.2378  0.6187  0.8291 
“Maximum Scenario” (aid netted out) 
-0.8 grant equivalent of imputed 
multilateral 
-All debt relief included 
-All technical cooperation included 
 
159 0.5424  0.5391  0.5507  0.2427  0.6468  0.8805 
“Preferred Scenario” (aid netted out) 
-0.5 grant equivalent of imputed 
multilateral 
-96 percent of debt relief deducted 









0.5415 0.2404  0.6319  0.8498 
Source:  Authors’ estimates based on data from World Bank (2004b) and DAC (2004) database on aid 
flows.  
 
The impact of aid on international inequality is extremely small when one is using 
inequality measures sensitive to high and middle incomes. It is slightly bigger, but remains 
very limited for inequality measures giving more weight to the poor – i.e. the mean 
logarithmic deviation or the Atkinson measure with high inequality aversion, e. The 
explanation of this result is given by Figure 2. In the maximum scenario, aid produces a  
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change in the poorest decile’s welfare equal to 14 percent and negligible proportions for 
intermediate deciles. Of course, it represents a loss for the top deciles approximately equal to 
the share of ODA in the GNI of donor countries, that is, approximately 0.25 percent in 2002.
16  
As a consequence, only international inequality indices which are very sensitive to the relative 
income of the poor are significantly affected by the international redistribution through aid. 
The Gini coefficient increases by .44 percentage point, from its base case value of 0.538, 
when aid is netted out. By contrast, the mean logarithmic deviation increases by almost 2 
percentage point, from the base case value of 0.5316.   
Interestingly, nearly half the .44 percentage point reduction in the Gini coefficient is 
removed when technical cooperation and debt relief are deducted.  This is not surprising given 
that nearly half of all grant aid in 2002 was in the form of either technical cooperation or debt 
relief.  In figure 2, we see that nearly half the impact on mean GNI per capita in the first 
decile is also eliminated.  Nevertheless, the increase of nearly 8 percent for the bottom decile 
is still fairly substantial. 
The preceding results should not be over-emphasized, however. Even when focusing 
on the change in the welfare of the poorest decile or considering poverty sensitive inequality 
measures, estimates of the effect of redistribution through aid are dwarfed when compared to 
the extent of redistribution that takes place within countries equipped with effective 
redistribution schemes.
17  Thus, the international redistribution that is taking place in the 
                                                 
16 Note that there is little difference between the three scenarios for the rich countries.  
17 By comparison, tax and transfer programs in the United Kingdom lower the Gini coefficient from 0.53 to 0.40 
– a full fifteen percent reduction—during the 1990s (Lakin 2001).  In France, the system of tax and transfers 
raises the final income (per adult equivalent) of the poorest 20 per cent by nearly 70 percent,  several other 
European countries having an even higher degree of overall redistribution (Bourguignon 1998).  In the 
developing country context, Mexico’s public expenditures (including in-kind services) decrease the Gini from 
0.48 to 0.39, an 18% reduction in inequality  (World Bank 2004a). Even though these various studies adopt 
different definitions of redistribution and are not strictly comparable, they show how important the scope for 
redistribution may be at the national level..     
  14
world through aid appears limited both in absolute terms and in comparison with what may be 
observed in single high-income and even middle-income countries.   
Of course, the preceding conclusion in no way means that aid is ineffective. If the 
assumption of an equal distribution of aid benefits within the population is accepted, then an 8 
to 15 percent increase in the real income of the poorest is not negligible. Figure 2 also reveals 
that, under the assumption that aid income is equally shared within countries aid is very 
effectively targeted towards the poorest of the poor.  Approximately 41 percent of all the aid 
made available by donors (measured in PPP dollars, and including technical cooperation and 
debt relief) goes to the poorest decile, and 25 percent is allocated to the second decile.
18  















Source:  Authors’ calculations based on data from World Bank (2004b) and aid flow data from DAC 
(2004).  See text for description of the scenarios. 
                                                 
18 We conducted a similar analysis for aid in 1985.  The major difference in the results was that less aid was 
distributed to the bottom deciles and more aid to the middle deciles, suggesting that the targeting of aid to the 
poorest countries has improved since the end of the Cold War.  
  15
 
V.  Redistribution through trade protection  
  To analyze the impact of existing trade protection on international inequality, we used 
the World Bank Linkage Model.
19   This model calculates the long-term steady-state gains 
from complete liberalization of trade in goods around the world simulated to take full effect 
by 2010.  These gains are expressed as the difference in welfare in 2015 relative to the 
baseline scenario of no additional trade liberalization.  In our exercise, we are discounting 
these future gains to 2002, our baseline year.  Thus, when we refer to “lost potential income 
from existing trade protection” or the “benefit from future trade liberalization,” we imply the 
steady-state gains calculated by the model. 
The model works with 27 “country units,” some of which are individual countries and 
others are regional groupings of countries.  (The details of the country groupings are 
presented in Appendix 3.)  To remain consistent with our initial framework, it has been 
assumed that all countries within a country group were affected in the same way by trade 
liberalization.  In order to capture the impact of rich countries’ policies on the developing 
countries, we used a scenario modeled by van der Mensbrugghe (2005) whereby only high-
income countries remove all tariffs on merchandise trade and all domestic agricultural 
support.
20  By estimating the difference with the benchmark situation, these simulations 
inform us on the impact of existing protection imposed on developing countries by high-
income countries. The model provides results for the static changes in GDP evaluated in PPP 
terms and changes in real household income; here, we concentrate on changes in real 
household income as a more appropriate welfare measure.  Economies of scale, productivity 
                                                 
19 Our gratitude to Dominique van der Mensbrugghe for providing the results and advising us on this exercise.  
Technical details on the model are to be found in van der Mensbrugghe (2005). 
20 See World Bank (2004a) for details.  
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gains, or other dynamic effects from trade are not reflected in this model.  In addition, 
liberalization of services is not considered.  We applied the relative changes in real household 
income to PPP-corrected GNI — assuming that GNI follows the same evolution as real 
household income — using 2001 as the base year, similar to the Linkage model. 
An important point to note in this exercise is that trade liberalization is increasing the 
efficiency of the world economy, so that the redistribution that it entails is a positive-sum 
game. However, this is not for the same reason as for aid.  In the case of aid, the overall gain 
was coming from transferring dollars to countries with lower costs of living. In the present 
case, the overall gain is the standard ‘gain from trade’. In effect, the world average welfare 
increases by approximately 0.4 percent as a result of the liberalization policy.  
In terms of inequality, the redistributive effects of high-income country protection in 
world trade are smaller in absolute value that those of aid.  The Gini coefficient of the 
international distribution would be lower by 0.06 percent in the absence of protection.  
However, the poverty sensitive measure like the Atkinson index with high levels of inequality 
aversion show much less variation than in the case of aid, suggesting that the redistribution 
that would take place through liberalization is not exclusively towards the poorest in the 
world.    
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Table 2.  Simulations of Trade Reform 
 
Case (all inequality 
measures are population 
weighted) 
 
Gini Theil  Mean  Atkinson 
  # of obs.    Entropy Log Dev e=0.5 e=2 e=5 
Base (with existing 
protection of merchandise 
trade by high-income 
countries) 
 





159 0.5425  0.5402 0.5394  0.2416  0.6189 0.8263
Source:  Authors’ estimates based on GTAP results for changes in household income due to full merchandise 
trade reform by high-income countries in 2001 (de Mensbrugghe 2005).  The “Base” inequality measures here 
differ from Table 1, since the baseline year in the case of trade is 2001 (the year used by de Mensbrugghe 2005), 
while in the case of aid it is 2002.  
 
 
  The figure below presents the impact of high-income countries’ trade liberalization in 
goods across deciles of world population.  Efficiency gains imply that all deciles lose because 
of protection. However, what matters for inequality is who loses more or less than the world 
average, represented by the dotted line in Figure 2. As anticipated on the basis of inequality 
measures, we can see in Figure 3 that low- and middle-income deciles, especially deciles one 
(Sub-Saharan Africa), eight (China, Malaysia and Philippines, many Latin American and 
Caribbean countries, Turkey) and nine (Middle East and North Africa, Thailand, Brazil, and 
Russia) as well as the second-highest vintile (some EU-25 countries, Hong Kong and 
Singapore, Australia and New Zealand, Japan, Canada)  benefit the most from merchandise 
trade reform in high-income countries, while the top vintile (USA and part of Canada) loses 
with respect to the average gain in the world economy but not in absolute terms (indeed, it 
still gains 0.02%).  Other relative losers include deciles 3, 5 and 6. In other words, trade 
liberalization in developed countries would benefit less those groups of people than average.  
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The dynamic effects of trade liberalization might imply that the losses from protectionism are 
a multiple of the values displayed in Figure 3.  To the extent that dynamic effects are similar 
across deciles, the losses from high-income country protectionism would still follow the 
pattern in the figure displayed below. 
Figure 3: Effects of High Income Country Protectionism 
High Income Country Protectionism: Percent 





































Note:  No productivity enhancement.  Change in real household income from the model. 
Dotted line represents aggregate world impact. Source: The Linkage Model (van der 
Mensbrugghe 2005). 
 
  It is interesting to discuss the combined impacts of the two sources of international 
redistribution discussed above – aid and trade protection.  To do so, we compare the 
redistribution effected via existing aid levels versus the lost income caused by the existing 
barriers to trade in rich countries.  In this way, we have a rough approximation of the impact 
of two international policies (aid and trade) on global distribution of income.  For the bottom 
deciles, part of the gains from aid is negated by the detrimental impact of trade barriers via 
lost income, but the overall effect remains positive.  For upper-middle income deciles, the lost  
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trade income cancels out the small income transfers received as aid.  Note that the 
comparisons should not be taken literally, since the base years of the two simulations differ: 
for aid, the base year is 2002, while for trade it is 2001.  
  To sum up, the analysis of the redistribution that takes place through aid and through 
protection leads to both positive and negative conclusions. The positive conclusion is that the 
poorest one or two deciles of the international distribution see their welfare increased, 
although in a limited way and with some ambiguity in the magnitude of change, since this 
depends on whether debt relief and technical cooperation are included or not.  Overall, the 
richest vintile of the international distribution - the richest countries - are neither losers nor 
gainers in this redistribution game: the impacts are just too small relative to GNI per capita in 
these countries. 
  As mentioned previously, we have not been taking into account the dynamic effects of 
aid and trade liberalization on growth in these exercises.   A way of proceeding would be to 
project GNI in the future based on the assumptions on how aid and trade protection may 
affect rates of growth (Appendix 1 extends the analysis of aid effects on inequality, based on 
the Collier-Dollar model of aid-growth relationship).  If those effects are proportional to the 
flows observed in 2002, which themselves correspond to some kind of a steady state, no big 
change will be obtained in terms of redistribution with respect to what we described above.  
Things would be different if there were a lot of heterogeneity in the way aid and trade 
protection affect countries’ rates of growth, but the literature is much too imprecise to go in 
that direction.   
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VI. Remittances:  conceptual and empirical difficulties 
  International factor income flows, or remittances, a priori, look very much like 
international income transfers, and in particular public and private aid. In particular, they look 
very much like a zero-sum game in which some countries appear as net transferors and others 
as net transferees.  This similarity between factor income flows and international transfers 
makes it very tempting to consider them on the same footing as other types of “development 
flows.” In effect, more and more frequently we hear top politicians referring to migrant 
worker remittances as contributing to the development of the countries of origin of migrants 
(Powell 2002), which in policymakers’ minds may be some kind of substitute or complement 
to more traditional aid flows.  
Such an approach is clearly flawed. There is an enormous difference between factor 
income flows and international income transfers. It is that the former are the counterpart of 
the delivery of a service, whereas the latter simply have no such counterpart.  Migrant 
workers perform a job in host countries and remittances must be seen as a part of the payment 
they receive for their activity that is being sent back home. Likewise, profit repatriation has to 
be seen as part of the return on the foreign direct investment that settled in a country over the 
past, the complement being undistributed and reinvested profits. There is no such direct 
economic counterpart to Official Development Assistance - even though aid is sometimes 
“tied” in one way or another - or in private development flows handled by NGOs. The fact 
that it is often difficult to distinguish statistically private “transfers” from “migrant worker 
remittances” should not lead to a conceptual confusion between those two types of flows.  
The preceding argument does not mean that no international redistribution is taking 
place through labor migration and capital flows. It simply emphasizes that international wage  
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or profit remittances and interest payments are not the right indicators of that redistribution. In 
effect, the problem is very much the same as that of international trade.  As shown above, the 
redistribution taking place through international trade cannot be gauged by tracking the 
payments made for the imports and exports of a specific commodity.  Nor would it make 
sense to consider that trade balances have anything to do with an income transfer.  In both 
cases, there is, again, a clear counterpart. In the case of exports or countries with a positive 
trade balance, it is the claim that is generated on goods produced by other countries.  In the 
case of imports and negative trade balances, it is the claim that other countries are acquiring 
on home goods.  
Yet, as seen in the previous section, some redistribution is taking place through 
international trade, or more exactly through the existence or the absence of impediments to 
trade.  Exactly the same kind of argument may be made in the case of labor and capital 
movements.  Welfare gains or losses associated with these movements can only be gauged by 
comparing them to a situation where those movements would be prohibited, or possibly the 
situation where they would be freed.  If rich countries were to liberalize their immigration 
policies, accepting more migrant workers from poor countries, this could potentially increase 
welfare in both rich and poor countries, but presumably in different proportions.  The extent 
of international redistribution that is taking place today through migration must thus be 
evaluated by comparing the present structure of barriers to migration to some benchmark 
situations, as for instance no migration or some arbitrary level of migration.  Moving from the 
present situation to one of these two benchmarks implies changes in national welfare, which 
may somehow be considered as the redistribution impact of today's international migration  
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regime.  This is exactly the approach that was followed in the preceding section for 
international trade.  
Following the example of trade, for instance, one method to evaluate the redistribution 
impact of labor migration would be to introduce barriers to migration in a model of the world 
economy and to see how the international allocation of production and consumption would be 
affected if those barriers were modified.  This is a difficult exercise, which would require data 
on stocks of migrants in host countries by country of origin, the wage differential between 
countries, the cost of migration, and also some rather strong assumptions on migration 
behavior, and parameters that may determine the volume of immigration in host countries.  In 
the absence of such a model both for labor and capital flows, and in view of the extremely 
imprecise data on both migration stocks and remittances, we have not pursued that direction 
here, leaving the issue of international redistribution through those two types of flows open to 
future research.
21   
VI.  Conclusions 
 
  Although this paper is about international inequality, we know that the actual level of 
global inequality of income is extremely high – with a Gini coefficient between 0.64 
(Milanovic 2005) and 0.66 (Bourguignon and Morrisson 2002).  If this level of inequality 
were to exist within a single country, that country would probably experience substantial 
social strife.  That this does not happen in the world simply means that, as of today, there is 
                                                 
21 A recent simulation conducted for the Global Economic Prospects 2006 of the World Bank (World Bank, 
2005c) uses a global Computable General Equilibrium model to estimate the impact on global income of an 
increase in migration equivalent to 3 percent of high-income countries’ labor force.  The simulations reveal an 
increase of 0.9 percent in global real income, adjusting for purchasing power parity, given the change in location 
of migrants’ own consumption.  In the simulation, most of the gains accrue to the new migrants themselves, 
while the only declines in real income are experienced by “old” migrants, i.e. the existing migrants prior to the 
increase in migration. We could not use these results in the framework developed in this paper because the 
assumption of identical income within all countries prevented to distinguish between nationals, old  and new 
migrants.   
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nothing like a global community.
22  Therefore, a renewed emphasis on increased 
redistribution from aid, lowering economic barriers that are detrimental to the poor of the 
world, and renewed policy reforms to assure that aid and freer movements of factors and 
goods enhance growth prospects for low-income countries are urgently needed. 
  The current aid flows are small globally but can be large locally.  They have a small 
impact on aggregate inequality indices, but more effect is revealed on a decile by decile basis.  
One discouraging result is that some of the favorable impact of aid is decimated by the 
negative impact of trade restrictions imposed by high-income countries on potential income in 
the developing world.  In brief, there is a contradiction in the set of international policies on 
aid and trade, where the benevolent hand of aid is somewhat countered by the malevolent 
hand of protectionism.   
  The analysis presented in this paper should be considered a first approximation.  It 
ignores, first of all, the important impact of policies on the within country distribution of 
income and how this affects the global distribution of income.  In addition, this analysis only 
takes a preliminary look at some of the general equilibrium effects (in the case of trade) of 
international policies, and abstracts away from externalities associated with trade 
liberalization or movements of factors across international borders.  
Finally, this paper treats redistribution as a static one-off phenomenon.  Aid and trade 
reforms (as well as investment financed by remittance flows) can all have a strong impact on 
growth.  As noted elsewhere (Bourguignon et al. 2004), growth needs to be revived in the 
                                                 
22 Kopczuk et al (2005) assume a Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function to study the optimal degree of 
redistribution if the function is taken as border-neutral—i.e., a citizen’s welfare weight is not a function of  his or 
her nationality.  The simulation shows that the optimal international income tax would result in vastly greater 
redistribution than exists in the world today.  The simulations also show that existing aid levels is consistent with 
the typical US citizen valuing foreigners’ well-being as 1/6 as important as an American citizen and 1/2000 for 
the residents of the poorest countries in the world.  
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stagnating economies of the bottom decile if recent trends toward lower international 
inequality – in population-weighted terms—are to continue.  More research should be done on 
how aid, trade liberalization, and factor flows affect growth, and through it, the global 
distribution of income.  
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Appendix 1:  Dynamic Effects of Aid – Aid as Investment 
 
  Section IV of the paper focused solely on the static impact of aid on the 
distribution on income between countries.  There, we treated aid as a static, one-off 
mechanism for redistribution of current consumption.  However, donor countries expect 
aid not just to increase consumption of recipient country citizens by the amount of ODA, 
but also to be invested in capital, which will enhance developing countries’ growth in the 
future.  In this appendix, we apply some of the results attained in the existing aid-growth 
literature to take a first cut at the potential dynamic redistribution impact of aid.  
Driven by the donor community’s desire to see aid contributing to growth and 
poverty reduction in developing countries, a vast literature emerged in the last decade 
exploring the connection between ODA and growth.  Representing the whole spectrum of 
model specifications and estimation methods, the studies conducted so far support one of 
three quite different conclusions about the effect of aid on growth.
23  First, there are 
studies, such as Clemens et al. 2004, which find aid always contributing to recipient 
countries’ growth, albeit sometimes with diminishing returns .  Other authors, most 
recently Easterly et al. (2003), reach the opposite conclusion that aid has at best, an 
insignificant, and at worst, a negative effect on growth. Finally, still other research on the 
same topic, as that conducted by Collier and Dollar (2002), yields conditional results, 
with the sign and magnitude of aid’s effect on growth depending on certain features or 
characteristics of recipient countries, such as quality of their institutions and policies or 
vulnerability to shocks.  This diversity of empirical results and the divergence of 
conclusions complicate our attempt to apply the findings of existing literature to an 
exercise assessing redistribution effects of aid as investment.  If we use the studies 
finding a negative correlation between aid and growth, then we would see that aid 
increases international inequality of income.  If, on the other hand, we focus on studies 
where aid is growth-enhancing, we will conclude that aid helps to equalize incomes in the 
world.  Thus, the conclusions of our exercise will depend on the study and the 
specification within the study from which we take the coefficient of aid on growth.   
For this exercise, we chose to concentrate on the conditional strand of aid-growth 
literature, since it has had the most influence on the donor community so far: Dollar and 
Levin (2004) find that the majority of donors have begun to focus their aid allocations on 
poor countries with better institutions.  So, to take a first cut at the dynamic effects of aid 
on growth and international inequality, we conduct a simple exercise based on one of the 
most well-known studies that finds conditional effects of aid on growth – Collier and 
Dollar (2002), which uses an expanded dataset to test the Burnside-Dollar (2000) 
hypothesis of policy-conditional effect of aid on growth.  We use the coefficients 
recorded by Collier and Dollar to examine the impact of aid on the resulting distribution 
of income across countries.  As a baseline, we project GNI per capita in PPP terms, based 
on the historical geometric average growth rate over the 1992-2002 period to arrive at a 
hypothetical GNI per capita for each country in 2012.  Then, we use the following 
estimates from Collier-Dollar, to deduct the growth impact of aid
24: 
 
                                                 
23 For an extended recent review of aid-growth literature, see Clemens et al. (2004). 
24 This estimated equation is the first specification listed in Table 1 of Collier and Dollar (2002).  
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Gi = {Set of variables not related to aid} –0.54*(ODAi/GDPi) – 
0.02*(ODAi/GDPi)
2 + 0.31*(CPIAi*ODAi/GDPi) 
 
where Gi is the growth rate of GNI per capita for country i, ODAi is Official 
Development Assistance for country i, and CPIAi is the World Bank’s Country Policy 
and Institutional Assessment index for country i. 
 
  We can then compare the resulting distribution of income across countries with 
the historical growth process as compared to a world in which aid does not impact growth 
rates according the empirical findings of Collier-Dollar.
25  The resulting differences in 
the two distributions are displayed below.  (Aid is measured in PPP terms for this 
exercise, so it is close to the “maximum scenario” described in the body of the paper.) 
The overall distributional effects are comparable to those obtained in the static case, 
except for deciles 2 and 3, where better policies generate larger growth benefits of aid.  
 
Figure A.1 
Cumulative Growth Effect If Historical Impact 










D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8 D9 D10a D10b
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using data from World Bank (2004b).  Three countries were 
removed from the sample used in the rest of the paper due to lack of PPP GNI data for the year 
1992 (Cambodia, Slovenia and Samoa.) 
 
                                                 
25 In the case of Mozambique, the estimated impact of aid on growth was adjusted as the values were 
particularly high.  
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Appendix 2:  PPP Measurement of Welfare Gains from Aid 
 
- A simple general equilibrium model of the effects of aid 
 
Consider the standard model of an economy that can produce two goods, a tradable good 
the quantity of which is denoted qT, and a non-tradable good the volume of which is 
denoted qN.  On the consumption side, the quantities of tradable and non-tradable goods 
consumed are respectively, cT and cN .  Gross National Income, Y, results from the 
production of tradable and non-tradable goods as well as from transfers, A, from abroad.  
 
A q q Y N T + + = . π           ( 1 )  
 
Note that the tradable good is implicitly used here as the numeraire. This means in 
particular that the transfer A is logically expressed in terms of the tradable good – by 
definition, donors cannot transfer non-tradable goods. It is assumed that this economy 
does not save so that the budget constraint faced by the representative consumer is :  
 
Y c c N T = +π            ( 2 )  
 
If the economy behaves in a competitive way, the quantity of tradable and non-tradable 
goods supplied by producers is obtained by maximizing the GNI  in (1) under the 
production constraint. Let qT(π) and qN(π) be the corresponding supply functions. 
Likewise, the quantity demanded of the two goods is obtained by maximizing the utility 
of the representative consumer  under the budget constraints (2). The corresponding 
demand functions are denoted cT(Y, π) and cN(Y, π).   
 
The equilibrium of the economy is given by the demand-supply equalities on the markets 
for tradable and non-tradable goods:     
 
) ( ) , ( ; ) ( ) , ( π π π π N N T T q Y c A q Y c = + =      ( 3 )  
 
Taken together these two equations determine the GNI, Y, and the price of the non-traded 
good, π. Of course, this system is equivalent to solving for the equilibrium on only one 




In order to evaluate the effect of a change in the volume of aid, A, on the domestic 
economy, it is sufficient to differentiate the equilibrium system (3) with respect to Y, π 
and A. Calculations reported in Bourguignon (2005) lead to the following result:  
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.       ( 4 )  
                                                 
26 In other words, system (E) is strictly equivalent to : 




where ψi and ϕi are respectively the share of good i (=T or N) in total production (GDP) 
and in consumption (GNI) and σq and σc  are respectively the elasticities of substitution 
between tradables and non-tradables on the production and the consumption side of the 
economy.   
 
-  Measuring the welfare gain from aid 
 
What is the change in the welfare of the representative consumer of the domestic 
economy that is due to a change in aid? The answer to this question depends on the way 
welfare is being measured. The case considered here is consistent with current practice of 
measuring welfare by the PPP-corrected Gross National Income.  
 
Following standard principles, let the Purchasing Power Parity index, P, be defined with 
reference to an international basket of goods  ) , ( N T a a and an international price system 













In other words, P is the value of an international basket of goods at international prices 
relative to the value of the same basket at domestic prices.  Without loss of generality, 
suppose that units are chosen in such a way that  1 = = + π π N T a a . Then, the welfare, W, 
of the representative agent in the domestic economy is defined as: 
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a b + =   is the share of non-traded goods in the international basket of 
goods at domestic prices.  
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On that expression, it can be seen that the relative welfare gain from aid is equal to the 
share of additional aid in GNI, both magnitudes being expressed in terms of the 
numeraire, say USD  with a corrective term. The latter depends on elasticities of 
substitution in the domestic economy and the difference in the tradable/non-tradable good 
proportion between the domestic economy and the international basket used in the 
calculation of the PPP index. No correction is needed in an economy where the elasticity 
of substitution either for production or for consumption is infinite, or where the GDP 
share of tradable goods would be the same as in the international PPP basket when 
evaluated at domestic prices.  
 
Accounting aid in PPP terms as done in the text is equivalent to ignoring that term, or to 
assume either that elasticities of substitution are very large or that consumption shares of 
tradables and non-tradables are not very different across countries.  
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Appendix 3: Country Lists for Various Exercises 
 
A3.1  Aid Exercise  
A3.2  Trade Exercise   
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A3.1 Aid simulations:  full sample from WDI 2004 (159 observations) 
Albania Dominica  Kuwait  Samoa 
Algeria  Dominican Republic  Kyrgyz Rep.  Saudi Arabia 
Angola Ecuador  Laos  Senegal 
Antigua & Barbuda  Egypt  Latvia  Sierra Leone 
Argentina El  Salvador  Lebanon  Singapore 
Armenia Eritrea  Lesotho  Slovak  Republic 
Australia Estonia  Lithuania Slovenia 
Austria Ethiopia  Luxembourg  Solomon  Islands 
Azerbaijan Fiji  Madagascar  South  Africa 
Bahrain Finland Malawi Spain 
Bangladesh France  Malaysia  Sri  Lanka 
Barbados FYROM-Macedonia  Mali  St.  Kitts-Nevis 
Belarus Gabon  Malta  St.  Lucia 
Belgium  Gambia  Mauritania  St. Vincent & Grenadines 
Belize Georgia  Mauritius  Sudan 
Benin Germany  Mexico  Swaziland 
Bolivia Ghana  Moldova  Sweden 
Botswana Greece  Mongolia Switzerland 
Brazil Grenada  Morocco  Syria 
Bulgaria Guatemala  Mozambique  Tajikistan 
Burkina Faso  Guinea  Namibia  Tanzania 
Burundi Guinea-Bissau  Nepal  Thailand 
Cambodia Guyana  Netherlands  Togo 
Cameroon Haiti  New  Zealand  Tonga 
Canada  Honduras  Nicaragua  Trinidad & Tobago 
Cape Verde  Hong Kong, China  Niger  Tunisia 
Central African Rep.  Hungary  Nigeria  Turkey 
Chad Iceland  Norway  Turkmenistan 
Chile India Oman  Uganda 
China Indonesia  Pakistan  Ukraine 
Colombia Iran  Panama  United  Kingdom 
Comoros  Ireland  Papua New Guinea  United States 
Congo Dem. Rep. (Zaire)  Israel  Paraguay  Uruguay 
Congo,  Rep.  Italy Peru Uzbekistan 
Costa Rica  Jamaica  Philippines  Vanuatu 
Cote d'Ivoire  Japan  Poland  Venezuela 
Croatia Jordan  Portugal  Viet  Nam 
Czech Republic  Kazakhstan  Romania  Yemen 
Denmark Kenya  Russia  Zambia 
Djibouti Korea  Rwanda  
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 A3.2  Trade Simulations 
 
The modeled regions are an aggregate of the 87 GTAP regions. The GTAP 
acronyms are in parenthesis. For details on the countries included in the GTAP 
aggregate regions see either the GTAP web site. 
1  ANZ  Australia and New Zealand (anz, nzl) 
2 EUR 
European Union-25 with EFTA (aut, bel, dnk, fin, fra, deu, gbr, 
grc, irl, ita, lux, nld, prt, esp, swe, cyp, cze, hun, mlt, pol, svk, 
svn, est, lva, ltu, che, xef, xer) 
3 CAN  Canada  (can) 
4  USA  United States (usa) 
5 JPN  Japan  (jpn) 
6  HYA  Korea and Taiwan, China (kor, twn) 
7  HYC  Hong Kong, China and Singapore (hkg, sgp) 
8 ARG  Argentina  (arg) 
9 BGD  Bangladesh  (bgd) 
10 BRA  Brazil  (bra) 
11 CHN  China  (chn) 
12 IND  India  (ind) 
13 IDN  Indonesia  (idn) 
14 MEX  Mexico  (mex) 
15 RUS  Russia  (rus) 
16  ZAF  South Africa (zaf) 
17 THA  Thailand  (tha) 
18 TUR  Turkey  (tur) 
19 VNM  Vietnam  (vnm) 
20  XSA  Rest of South Asia (lka, xsa) 
21  XEA  Rest of East Asia and Pacific (mys, phl) 
22 RLC 
Rest of Latin America and the Caribbean (col, per, ven, xap, chl, 
ury, xsm, xca, xfa, xcb) 
23  XEC  Rest of Europe and Central Asia (alb, bgr, hrv, rom, xsu) 
24  MNA  Middle East and North Africa (xme, mar, tun, xnf) 
25 SSS 
Selected SSA countries (bwa, mwi, moz, tza, zmb, zwe, mdg, 
uga) 
26  XSS  Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa (xsc, xsd, xss) 
27  ROW  Rest of the World (xoc, xea, xse, xna)   
Source: van der Mensbrugghe (2005). 